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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: James Mercer, 87-C-0688 
Marcy Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 3600 
Marcy, NY 13403-3600 
Marcy CF 
10-023-19 B 
Decision appealed: September 2019 decision, denyirlg discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Berliner 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived November 4, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation · 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, 'Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case . -- - :Pian.--- . ... .. --- .... --- --- · · -- ...... · -----·-.. ------ ·· ·- --... --· · - - -- ··-· ... __ ---.. - .. · 






_ yacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ _ _ 
_ . Vacated, remanded for de novo i~terview _ Mpdified to ___ _ 
t. ~'!\L Affirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommen~ation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determ~1mtion, the rel~ted Statement of the Appeals Unit's Finding~ and the separa;e fljl~ings ~f- , 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 3//tJ/oliWJ 66 
~ 1 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Centraf File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) 
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Appellant challenges the September 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant, on three separate occasions, 
forcing young female victims into his vehicle, driving them to a remote location, and sexually 
assaulting them. The three victims were 13, 15, and 17 years old. Appellant raises the following 
issues: 1) the decision was arbitrary, capricious and irrational bordering on impropriety because 
the Board relied solely on the nature of the offenses and past criminal history; 2) the enactment of 
the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (“SOMA”) foreclosed the Board from rendering 
final determinations regarding the release of sexual offenders such as Appellant; 3) the Board 
effectively resentenced Appellant to his Conditional Release (“CR”) date based on his failure to 
complete sex offender programming; 4) the Board’s decision was conclusory; and 5) the Board 
failed to give appropriate weight to the results of the COMPAS and improperly disagreed with the 
scoring. These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
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157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of six counts of Sodomy in the first degree, two 
counts of Rape in the first degree, three counts of Sodomy in the second degree, Rape in the second 
degree, two counts of Sexual Abuse in the first degree, Assault in the second degree, and Sodomy 
in the third degree, committed while on parole for a prior sexual offense; Appellant’s criminal 
history including a prior conviction for Sexual Abuse in the first degree involving a 7-year-old 
girl; Appellant’s institutional efforts including clean disciplinary record since 2015, positive 
programming, and failure to complete sex offender treatment; and release plans to live with his 
mother and work in carpentry or another building trade. The Board also had before it and 
considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, 
a letter from the District Attorney, a letter from the sentencing judge, letters from the community, 
and Appellant’s parole packet. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, committed while on parole for a prior 
conviction for sexual abuse and representing a continuation and escalation of sexual assault-related 
behavior, and a lack of sincerity and depth in Appellant’s expressions of remorse. See Matter of 
Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 
N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d 
Dept. 2016); Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); 
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); People ex rel. Herbert 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983); .  Matter 
of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016).  
 
 There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that the enactment of SOMA foreclosed the Board from 
rendering final determinations regarding the release of sexual offenders such as himself. The Board 
has the power to determine whether any inmates serving an indeterminate sentence of 
imprisonment, such as Appellant, may be released on parole pursuant to Executive Law § 259-
c(1) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.1(a). 
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Appellant’s assertion that the Board effectively resentenced him to his CR date based on his 
failure to complete sex offender programming is also without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled 
its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after 
considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter 
of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New 
York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 
2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate 
notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. 
Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 
A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 
698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).  The Board’s 
determination with respect to discretionary release is a distinct basis for release that has no impact 
on conditional release. The Board may also consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative 
programming even where a delay in commencement is through no fault of the inmate.  See Matter 
of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997).   
 
Appellant’s claim that the Board’s decision was conclusory is without merit. The Board’s 
decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed 
to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. 
Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 
742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 
A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 
There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to give appropriate weight to the 
results of the COMPAS. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  
This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).   However, the 
COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the 
Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors 
and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board 
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conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the 
instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board 
is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, 
the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 
N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board 
must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three 
standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 
990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 
N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 
N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.   
 
Finally, the Board considered Appellant’s COMPAS instrument but disagreed with the low risk 
scores indicated therein as it is entitled to do. Specifically, the Board disagreed with the low score 
for risk of felony violence in light of the violent sexual assaults and cited it as a concern.   The 
COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ 
independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should 
be released.  See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 
A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.    
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
